CIA History Staff Monograph: The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance

Approved for Release 2026 Secret NOFORN THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AND OVERHEAD RECONNAISSANCE The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954 - 1974 Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach Secret

Secret NOFORN The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance: The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974 -Secret-

Secret NOFORN The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance: The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974 Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach History Staff Central Intelligence Agency Washington, D.C. 1992 -Secret-

Contents ◆ Chapter 1 Searching for a System The Need for High-Altitude Reconnaissance................................................................ 1 Early Postwar Aerial Reconnaissance........................................................................ 2 New Approaches to…

-Secret NOFORN Hiring U-2 Pilots .................................................................................................... 73 Pilot Training ........................................................................................................ 75 Final Tests of the U…

Seeret NOFORN- →→Chapter 5 U-2 Operations After May 1960 U-2 Operations in Latin America ........................................................................ 197 U-2 Support to the Bay of Pigs Invasion.......................................................... 197 Aerial Refue…

Secret NΟΓΟΑΝ New Technologies Necessitated By OXCART's High Speed.............................. 279 Designing the OXCART's Cameras .................................................................... 281 Choosing Pilots for OXCART ................................................…

Warning Notice Intelligence Sources or Methods Involved (WNINTEL) National Security Information Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions Dissemination Control Abbreviations NOFORN (NF) NOCONTRACT (NC) PROPIN (PR) ORCON (OC) REL... WN Not releasable to foreign nationa…

Seeret NOFORN FOREWORD This History Staff Monograph offers a comprehensive and authorita- tive history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program, which from 1954 to 1974 developed and operated two extraordinary aircraft, the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It describes not onl…

Secret NOFORN- reconnaissance program offers no tidy model for imitation, it does reveal how resourceful managers coped with unprecedented techno- logical challenges and their implications for intelligence and national policy. For this reason, the program's history provides profi…

Secret NOFORN- PREFACE When the Central Intelligence Agency came into existence in 1947, no one foresaw that, in less than a decade, it would undertake a major program of overhead reconnaissance, whose principal purpose would be to fly over the Soviet Union. Traditionally, the mi…

Seeret NOFORN- later, at press conferences in February and July 1964, President Lyndon B. Johnson revealed the existence of the OXCART-type of aircraft, although only in its military YF-12A (interceptor) and SR-71 (strategic reconnaissance) versions. The two CIA reconnaissance ai…

-Seeret NOFORN Helen Hill Kleyla and Robert D. O'Hern. This 16-volume Top Secret Codeword study of the Agency's reconnaissance aircraft provides a wealth of technical and operational information on the two projects but does not attempt to place them in their historical context. W…

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 1 1 Searching for a System THE NEED FOR HIGH-ALTITUDE RECONNAISSANCE For centuries, soldiers in wartime have sought the highest ground or structure in order to get a better view of the enemy. At first it was tall trees, then church steeples and bell towers.…

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 1 2 By 1949 the Soviet Union and the states of Eastern Europe had been effectively curtained off from the outside world, and the Soviet military carried out its planning, production, and deployment activi- ties with the utmost secrecy. All Soviet strategic…

-Secret NOFORIN Chapter 1 3 Interrogation of returning Germans offered only fragmentary in- formation, and this source could not be expected to last much longer. As a result, in the late 1940s, the US Air Force and Navy began trying to obtain aerial photography of the Soviet Unio…

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 1 4 The Soviet Union's air defense policy became even more aggres- sive in August 1952, when its reconnaissance aircraft began violating Japanese airspace over Hokkaido, the northernmost Japanese home island. Two months later, on 7 October 1952, Soviet figh…

Secret NΟFORN- Chapter 1 5 In Leghorn's view, altitude was the key to success for overhead reconnaissance. Since the best Soviet interceptor at that time, the MIG-17, had to struggle to reach 45,000 feet,⁶ Leghorn reasoned that an aircraft that could exceed 60,000 feet would be s…

Secret NOFORN Chapter 1 6 RAF Canberra Mark-PR3 division in Baltimore, headed by Lt. Col. Joseph J. Pellegrini, had to approve all new reconnaissance aircraft designs. Pellegrini's unit reviewed Leghorn's design and ordered extensive modifications. According to Leghorn, Pellegrin…

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 1 7 was only 64,000 feet. Meanwhile Leghorn, frustrated by the rejection of his original concept, had transferred to the Pentagon in early 1952 to work for Col. Bernard A. Schriever, Assistant for Development Planning to the Air Force's Deputy Chief of Staf…

Seeret NOFORN Chapter 1 8 The Air Force Search for a New Reconnaissance Aircraft With interest in high-altitude reconnaissance growing, several Air Force agencies began to develop an aircraft to conduct such mis- sions. In September 1952, the Air Research and Development Command…

Secret NOFORN | Chapter 1 9 produce a better aircraft more quickly. In July 1953, the Bell Aircraft Corporation of Buffalo, New York, and the Fairchild Engine and Airplane Corporation of Hagerstown, Maryland, received study con- tracts to develop an entirely new high-altitude rec…

Secret NOFORN Chapter 1 10 MX-2147 FACH MX-2147 BELL MARTIN MODEL 294 Designs for the Air Force competition for a high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft Lockheed also submit a design. Carter noted that the proposed aircraft would have to reach altitudes of between 65, 000 and 70,0…

Secret -NOFORN Chapter 1 11 gravity (g's) instead of the military specification strength of 5.33 g's. For the power plant he selected the General Electric J73/GE-3 nonaf- terburning turbojet engine with 9,300 pounds of thrust (this was the same engine he had chosen for the F-104,…

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 1 12 The Lockheed CL-282 Development Planning. According to Wienberg, General LeMay stood up halfway through the briefing, took his cigar out of his mouth, and told the briefers that, if he wanted high-altitude photographs, he would put cameras in his B-36…

Secret NOFORNT Chapter 1 13 World War II in multiengine bombers. In addition, aerial photography experts in the late 1940s and early 1950s emphasized focal length as the primary factor in reconnaissance photography and, therefore, pre- ferred large aircraft capable of accommodati…

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 1 14 Trevor Gardner design showed the most promise for reconnaissance of the Soviet Union. This belief was shared by Gardner's special assistant, Frederick Ayer, Jr., and Garrison Norton, an adviser to Secretary Talbott.²¹ According to Norton, Gardner tried…

Secret NOFORN Chapter 1 15 mainly with XF-104 jigs and designs.... The prototype of this plane can be produced within a year from the date of order. Five planes could be delivered for operations within two years.. The Bell proposal is a more conventional aircraft having nor- mal…

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 1 16 Richard M. Bissell, Jr. States might use against the Soviet Bloc in the event of another up- rising such as the East Berlin riots of June 1953. Bissell quickly concluded that there was not much hope for clandestine operations against Bloc nations. As h…

Secret NOFORN Chapter 1 17 Moreover, high-altitude reconnaissance of the Soviet Union did not fit well into Allen Dulles's perception of the proper role of an intelli- gence agency. He tended to favor the classical form of espionage, which relied on agents rather than technology.…

Secret NOFORN Chapter 1 18 defense known as Project LINCOLN, then under way at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. By the end of the year, these experts had assembled in Boston to begin their research. Their head-quarters was located over a secretarial school on Beacon Hil…

Secret NOFORN Chapter 1 19 document on 15 June 1952, the BEACON HILL Report advocated radical approaches to obtain the information needed for national intel-ligence estimates. Its 14 chapters covered radar, radio, and photo-graphic surveillance; examined the use of passive infrar…

Secret NΟΓΟΠΝ- Chapter 1 20 scientists. Thus, new and extremely powerful weapons were coming into the hands of a government whose actions greatly disturbed the leaders of the West. Only two months before the successful hydrogen bomb test, Soviet troops had crushed an uprising in…

-Secret NOFORN Chapter 1 21 Soviet Myasishchev-4 bomber (the Bison) The Air Force Intelligence Systems Panel Even before the publication of photographs of the Bison raised fears that the Soviet bomber force might eventually surpass that of the United States, the Air Force had al…

Secret NOFORN Chapter 1 22 lenses. Since the university did not wish to continue manufacturing cameras and lenses after the end of the war, the optical laboratory moved to Boston University, which agreed to sponsor the effort as long as the Air Force would fund it. Baker decided…

Secret NOFORN Chapter 1 23 The wide variety of programs discussed at the conference were all products of the Air Force's all-out effort to find a way to collect intelligence on the Communist Bloc. Some of the schemes went be-yond the existing level of technology; others, like the…

Secret NΟΓΟΠΝ- Chapter 1 24 Allen F. Donovan Baker also chaired the next meeting of the Air Force's Intelligence Systems Panel in late April 1954 but could not tell its members about the British overflight of Kapustin Yar because they were not cleared for this information. The pa…

Seeret NΟΓΟΑΝ Chapter 1 25 CL-282 design was essentially a jet-propelled glider capable of attain-ing the altitudes that he felt were necessary to carry out reconnais-sance of the Soviet Union successfully." Upon his return east on 8 August, Donovan got in touch with James Baker…

Secret NOFORN Chapter 1 26 wingroot areas to withstand the high speeds and sharp turns man-dated by the standard military airworthiness rules added too much weight to the airframe, thereby negating the efficiency of the sail-plane wing. In short, it was possible to achieve altit…

Seeret NOFORN Chapter 1 27 Gardner, the committee members decided to approach President Eisenhower on the matter. On 27 March 1954, the President told them about the discovery of the Soviet Bison bombers and his concern that these new aircraft might be used in a surprise attack o…

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 1 28 Technological Capabilities Panel The President of the United States Director, Office of Defense Mobilization Executive Staff David Z. Beckler, ODM Lt. Col. V. T. Ford, USAF Administrative Staff William Brazeal M. Comerford C. Klett L. Wiesner E. Hocket…

-Secret NOFORN Chapter 1 29 the task of investigating the nation's intelligence capabilities. Its chairman was Edwin H. (Din) Land, the inventor of the polarizing fil-ter and the instant camera. When James Killian asked Land to head Project Three, Land had to make a major decisio…

Secret NOFORN Chapter 1 30 briefly mention a Lockheed design for a high-flying aircraft at the 24-25 May meeting of Baker's Intelligence Systems Panel, he did not realize that that plane and the one in Strong's drawing were the same. As soon as Land saw Strong's copy of the CL-28…

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 1 31 attention to a section of the report about a "stripped or specialized aircraft" called the Lockheed CL-282." By September 1954, Land's Project Three study group had be-come very much interested in the Lockheed CL-282 design. Their in-terest grew even…

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 1 32 camera with tremendously improved resolution and film capacity, and the Eastman Kodak company was working on new thin, lightweight film. 55 By October 1954, the Project Three study group had drafted a complete program for an overhead reconnaissance ef…

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 1 33 to do so because the Land committee was part of a panel commis-sioned by President Eisenhower to examine the nation's intelligence community and recommend changes. The committee thus had a direct line to the White House through James Killian's contacts…

-Secret NOFORN Chapter 1 34 The letter had two attachments: a two-page summary of a com-plete operational plan for organizing, building, and deploying the CL-282 within a period of 20 months at a cost of $22 million and a three-page memorandum, entitled "A Unique Opportunity for…

-Seeret NOFORN- Chapter 1 35 over DCI Dulles, but a project of this magnitude also required the support of the Air Force. Some Air Force officials, however, feared that a decision to build the CL-282 might jeopardize the Air Force's own RB-57 and X-16 projects. Just one month ear…

Secret NOFORN Chapter 1 36 On 19 November, the day after Seaberg's briefing, the final deci-sion on the CL-282 came at a luncheon hosted by Air Force Secretary Talbott. The participants—Dulles and Cabell from the CIA; Gardner, Ayer, and General Putt from the Air Force; Kelly John…

Secret NOFORN Chapter 1 37 President and received verbal authorization to proceed. Eisenhower told Dulles that the project was to be managed by the Agency and that the Air Force was to provide any assistance needed to get it operational." Thus, it was that the CIA entered into t…

Secret NOFORN Chapter 2 39 2 Developing the U-2 THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE U-2 PROJECT On 26 November 1954, the day after Thanksgiving, Allen Dulles called his special assistant, Richard Bissell, into his office to tell him that President Eisenhower had just approved a very secre…

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 2 40 James A. Cunningham, Jr. sat down with a group of key Air Force officials that included Trevor Gardner and Lt. Gen. Donald L. Putt. The participants spent very lit-tle time delineating Air Force and Agency responsibilities in the pro-ject, taking for g…

Secret NOFORN Chapter 2 41 Project AQUATONE Personnel Special Assistant to the DCI for Planning and Coordination Headquarters CIA 18 USAF 7 25 US Field Test Base CIA 26 26 Foreign Field Base A CIA 16 USAF 34 Contract 52 102 Foreign Field Base B CIA 16 USAF 34 Contract 52 102 Fore…

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 2 42 The Matomic Building total of 357 personnel divided among project headquarters, a US test-ing facility, and three foreign field bases. CIA employees represented only one-fourth (92) of the total. The Air Force personnel commit-ment was larger, with 109…

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 2 43 at 1717 H Street, NW. Here the staff remained for the next six years until it moved into the new CIA Headquarters building at Langley in March 1962. The final move came in January 1968, when the project staff (by that time known as the Office of Specia…

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 2 44 use. Public Law 110, approved by the 81st Congress on 20 June 1949, designates the Director of Central Intelligence as the only government employee who can obligate Federal money without the use of vouch-ers. By using unvouchered funds, it is possible…

-Seeret-NOFORN Chapter 2 45 As it turned out, no review of the contract was necessary at the three-fourths point. Lockheed delivered the aircraft not only on time but under budget. During the final contract negotiations in the spring of 1958, Lockheed and the US Government agreed…

Secret NOFORN Chapter 2 46 Skunk Works Design Staff speed of Mach 0.8 or 460 knots at altitude. Its initial maximum alti-tude would be 70,600 feet and the ultimate maximum altitude would be 73,100 feet. According to these early December 1954 specifica-tions, the new plane would t…

Secret NOFORN Chapter 2 47 In designing the U-2 aircraft, Kelly Johnson was confronted with two major problems—fuel capacity and weight. To achieve interconti-nental range, the aircraft had to carry a large supply of fuel, yet, it also had to be light enough to attain the ultrahi…

Secret NOFORN, Chapter 2

Secret NOΓΟΡΝ Chapter 2 48 U-2 at testing site before attachment of wings and tail assembly that they could be recovered and reused. The aircraft landed on its front and back landing gear and then gradually tilted over onto one of the wingtips, which were equipped with landing…

Secret NOFORN, Chapter 2

Secret NOFORN Chapter 2 49 engine, but no firm plans existed for the all-important cameras. Existing cameras were too bulky and lacked sufficient resolution to be used in high-altitude reconnaissance. The workhorses of World War II aerial photography had been the Fairchild K-19…

Secret NOFORN, Chapter 2

Seeret NOFORN Chapter 2 50 James G. Baker The first success in designing very-high-acuity lenses came in the mid-1940s, when James G. Baker of Harvard and Richard S. Perkin of the Perkin-Elmer (P-E) Company of Norwalk, Connecticut, collaborated on a design for an experimental c…

Secret NOFORN, Chapter 2

his research associate duties at Harvard and his service on government advisory bodies, Baker established a small firm known as Spica, Incorporated, on 31 January 1955. The A-1 camera system consisted of two 24-inch K-38 framing cameras. One was mounted vertically and photograph…

Secret NOFORN, Chapter 2

Secret NOFORN Chapter 2 52 A-2 camera U-2s equipped with the A-1 camera system also carried a Perkin-Elmer tracking camera using 2.75-inch film and a 3-inch lens. This device made continuous horizon-to-horizon photographs of the terrain passing beneath the aircraft. Because the…

Secret NOFORN, Chapter 2

Baker's new lenses were used in a camera system known as the A-2, which returned to a trimetrogon arrangement because of problems with the A-1 system's rocking mount. The A-2 consisted of three separate K-38 framing cameras and 9.5-inch film magazines. One K-38 filmed the right o…

Secret NOFORN, Chapter 2

Secret NOΟΓΟΑΝ Chapter 2 54 B camera operating time. Three of the seven B-camera frames provided stereo coverage. The complex B cameras were engineered by Hycon's chief designer, William McFadden.¹⁹ James Baker's idea for the ultimate high-altitude camera was the C model that…

Secret NOFORN, Chapter 2

Realizing that the 240-inch lens was both too large and too heavy for the camera bay, Baker scaled the lens down to a 200-inch f/16. 0 system. This was still too big. Further reductions followed, resulting by July 1955 in a 120-inch f/10.9 lens that met both the weight and space…

Secret NOFORN, Chapter 2

Secret NOFORN Chapter 2 56 In addition to the camera systems, the U-2 carried one other important item of optical equipment, a periscope. Designed by James Baker and built by Walter Baird of Baird Associates, the optical periscope helped pilots recognize targets beneath the airc…

Secret NOFORN, Chapter 2

Secret NOFORIN Chapter 2 57 are shown on current unclassified maps as a small rectangular area adjoining the northeast corner of the much larger Nevada Test Site. To make the new facility in the middle of nowhere sound more attractive to his workers, Kelly Johnson called it the…

Area 51 Oregon 20 Kilometers 20 Miles Area 51 Groom Lake Mojave AEC Nevada Test Site Yucca Lake Desert Frenchman Flat Indian Springs Nevada see inset above Indian Springs Las Vegas San Francisca California North Pacific Ocean Edwards AFB Arizona Burbank Pasadena…

Secret NOFORN, Chapter 2

Secret NOFORN Chapter 2 59 SECURITY FOR THE U-2 PROJECT On 29 April 1955, Richard Bissell signed an agreement with the Air Force and the Navy (which at that time was also interested in the U-2) in which the services agreed that the CIA "assumed primary responsibility for all se…

Secret NOFORN, Chapter 2

devices had to be calibrated to 80,000 feet. This immediately raised eyebrows at Kollman because its instruments only went to 45,000 feet. Agency security personnel quickly briefed several Kollman officials and produced a cover story that the altimeters were to be used on experim…

Secret NOFORN, Chapter 2

Secret NOFORN Chapter 2 61 project—the construction and testing of the aircraft—remained the exclusive province of Lockheed.²⁹ As a result of this agreement, CIA remained in control of the program, but the Air Force played a very important role as well. As Richard Bissell later…

Secret NOFORN, Chapter 2

Secret NOFORN Chapter 2 62 Leo P. Geary (USAF, Ret.), a vice president of the Shell Oil Company who had long been involved in overhead reconnaissance (most recently as a member of the Technological Capabilities Panel), arranged for Shell to develop a special low-volatility, low…

Secret NOFORN, Chapter 2

advanced gear for the U-2 pilots. David Clark expert Joseph Ruseckas then developed a complex life-support system, which was the first partially pressurized "spacesuit" for keeping humans alive for lengthy periods at ultrahigh altitudes. The effort to provide a safe environment f…

Secret NOFORN, Chapter 2

Secret NOFORN Chapter 2 64 The early models of these MC-2 and MC-3 partial-pressure suits were very uncomfortable for the pilots. To prevent loss of pressure, the heavy coverall had to fit tightly at the wrists and ankles (in the early models of these suits, the feet were not in…

Secret NOFORN, Chapter 2

To prevent pilots from becoming dessicated during the long missions—a condition aggravated by their having to breathe pure oxygen—provision was made for them to drink sweetened water. This was accomplished by providing a small self-sealing hole in the face mask through which the…

Secret NOFORN, Chapter 2

Secret NOFORN Chapter 2 66 led Bissell and Cunningham to approach Dr. Alex Batlin of Technical Services Division in the Directorate of Plans³⁷ for ideas to help "captured" U-2 pilots avoid such suffering. Batlin suggested the method used by Nazi war criminal Hermann Goering, a t…

Secret NOFORN, Chapter 2

Secret NOFORN Chapter 2 67 Arrival of U-2 prototype at Area 51 (left); Article 341, the U-2 prototype (below) Johnson had designed the U-2 to use the Pratt & Whitney (P&W) J57/P-31 engine, which developed 13,000 pounds of thrust and weighed 3,820 pounds, giving it a power-to-we…

Secret NOFORN, Chapter 2

Secret NOFORN Chapter 2 68 power-to-weight ratio of 2.7:1 was almost 20 percent less efficient than the preferred P-31 version.⁴⁰ To conduct lengthy missions over hostile territory, the U-2 needed to carry a large amount of fuel. Kelly Johnson used a "wet-wing" design for the U…

Secret NOFORN, Chapter 2

followed on 1 August. LeVier accelerated to 70 knots and began to try the ailerons. "It was at this point that I became aware of being airborne," Le Vier noted afterward, "which left me with utter amazement, as I had no intentions whatsoever of flying. I immediately started back…

Secret NOFORN, Chapter 2

Secret NOFORN Chapter 2 70 First flight of the U-2, 4 August 1955 With Kelly Johnson watching from a chase plane and giving a constant stream of instructions, LeVier made three more unsuccessful landing attempts. With the light fading and a thunderstorm fast approaching from th…

Secret NOFORN, Chapter 2

LeVier made an additional 19 flights in article 341 before moving on to other Lockheed flight test programs in early September. This first phase of U-2 testing explored the craft's stall envelope, took the aircraft to its maximum stress limit (2.5 g's), and explored its speed pot…

Secret NOFORN, Chapter 2

Secret NOFORN Chapter 2 72 As the deliveries of U-2 airframes to the testing site increased, a major logistic problem arose: how to transfer Lockheed employees from Burbank to Area 51 without arousing a great deal of curiosity. The project staff decided that the simplest approac…

Secret NOFORN, Chapter 2

Not only did the airline pilots report their sightings to air-traffic controllers, but they and ground-based observers also wrote letters to the Air Force unit at Wright Air Development Command in Dayton charged with investigating such phenomena. This, in turn, led to the Air For…

Secret NOFORN, Chapter 2

Secret NOFORN Chapter 2 74 recruits in mid-1955. Geary arranged for an Air Force officer of [REDACTED] to stay with the group during a preliminary training program at Luke Air Force Base. The plan to use foreign pilots soon ran into trouble when only [REDACTED] pilots passed the…

Secret NOFORN, Chapter 2

28 November 1955. The CIA's insistence on more stringent physical and mental examinations than those used by the Air Force to select pilots for its U-2 fleet resulted in a higher rejection rate of candidates. The Agency's selection criteria remained high throughout its manned ove…

Secret NOFORN, Chapter 2

Secret NOFORN Chapter 2 76 and could not survive the stresses of loops and barrel rolls. Moreover, the original U-2s were placarded, which meant that they could not be flown at sea level faster than 190 knots in smooth air or 150 knots in rough air. At operational altitude, wher…

Secret NOFORN, Chapter 2

have CIA act as executive agent for this transaction, which the Air Force called Project DRAGON LADY. To maintain secrecy, the Air Force transferred funds to the CIA, which then placed an order with Lockheed for 29 U-2s in configurations to be determined by the Air Force. The Air…

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 2 78

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 2 78 U-2 detachment in formation over Nevada Colonel Yancey's group carefully examined all aspects of the U-2 unit from flight crews to camera technicians and mission pro- grammers. When the exercise was over, Yancey reported that the de- tachment was rea…

Koon, call the commander of Kirtland AFB near Albuquerque. General Koon told the base commander about the sealed orders and explained that an unusual aircraft would make a deadstick landing at Kirtland within the next half hour. The general then instructed the base commander to h…

Secret NOFORN Chapter 2 80

Secret NOFORN Chapter 2 80 wings parallel to the ground during takeoff. Once airborne, Rose made a low-level pass over the airstrip and shook loose the lefthand pogo. When he attempted to make a righthand turn to come back over the runway to shake loose the remaining pogo, Rose…

and plan missions in view of priority and feasibility, to maintain the operation on a continuing basis, and to carry out the dissem- ination of the resulting information in a manner consistent with its special security requirements.61 When the U-2's development and testing appro…

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 2 82

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 2 82 Arthur C. Lundahl ARC gave the top priority target list to the Project Director, and the project staff's operations section then used the list to plan the flightpaths for U-2 missions. Although the requirements committee was not responsible for devel…

flood of photographs that the U-2 would bring back, so in May 1955 the Directorate of Support (DS) authorized expanding PID to 44 per- sons. Soon afterward the division moved from its room in M Building to larger quarters in Que Building. The Photo-Intelligence Division continue…

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 2 84

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 2 84 Project GENETRIX balloon launch THE IMPACT OF THE AIR FORCE PROJECT GENETRIX BALLOONS While the Agency was making its final preparations for U-2 over- flights, the Air Force started a reconnaissance project that would cause considerable protest arou…

the People's Republic of China. This project had its origins in a RAND Corporation study from 1951. By the end of 1955, the Air Force had overcome a number of technical problems in camera design and recovery techniques and had manufactured a large number of bal- loons for use in…

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 2 86

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 2 86 SPOIL NUCLEAR STORAGE AREA PROB ORE CRUSHING PLANT HEAD FRAME AREA Photograph of Dodonovo Atomic Energy complex taken by a Project GENETRIX balloon ELECTRIFIED RAIL YENISEY RIVER All of this publicity and protest led President Eisenhower to con- cl…

Although the photo intelligence gained from Project GENETRIX was limited in quantity, it was still some of the best and most com- plete photography obtained of the Soviet Union since World War II. It was referred to as "pioneer" photography because it provided a base- line for al…

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 2 88

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 2 88 These positive results from Project GENETRIX did not outweigh the political liabilities of the international protests. CIA officials be- came concerned that the ill will generated by balloon overflights could sour the Eisenhower administration on all…

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 2 89

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 2 89 THE U-2 COVER STORY In February 1956, while the controversy over balloon flights was still raging and the U-2 was completing its final airworthiness tests, Richard Bissell and his staff began working on a cover story for over- seas operations. It was…

Secret NOFORN Chapter 2 90

Secret NOFORN Chapter 2 90 used in various scenarios, including one in which the pilot was cap- tured. Even in such a case, however, the proposed policy was for the United States to stick to the weather research cover story, a course of action that would prove disastrous in May…

U-2 Operations in the Soviet Bloc and Middle East, 1956-1968 By January 1956, everyone working on Project AQUATONE could see that the U-2 was nearing the time for operational deployment. During tests the aircraft had met all the criteria established in late 1954. Its range of 2,…

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 3 94

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 3 94 THE DEPLOYMENT OF DETACHMENT A TO LAKENHEATH The first Agency U-2 detachment, consisting of four aircraft and pilots, was known publicly as the 1st Weather Reconnaissance Squadron, Provisional (WRSP-1). The "provisional" designation gave the U-2 deta…

same time, Richard Bissell learned that the State Department had told Prime Minister Eden that only one U-2 was based at Lakenheath, when in reality there were four.4 THE MOVE TO WIESBADEN To avoid arousing further reaction in the United Kingdom and to begin the program of U-2…

-Secret NOFORN- Chapter 3 96

-Secret NOFORN- Chapter 3 96 Nathan Twining prepared a paper for the President outlining "AQUATONE Operational Plans." In the meantime, President Eisenhower had entered Walter Reed Hospital for tests for an abdomi- nal ailment that turned out to be ileitis, requiring an operatio…

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 3 97

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 3 97 Even though President Eisenhower had approved every stage of the U-2's development, knowing full well that the aircraft was being built to fly over the Soviet Union, the actual decision to authorize such flights was very difficult for him. He remained…

-Secret NOFORN- Chapter 3 98

-Secret NOFORN- Chapter 3 98 Colonel Goodpaster with President Eisenhower take it as a certainty that no pilot would survive... and that al- though they would know where the plane came from, it would be difficult to prove it in any convincing way.11 CIA assurances that the U-2…

Soviet Air Forces.12 Early in 1956, concern about a possible Soviet advantage in long-range bombers grew as Air Force Chief of Staff Twining informed the Senate Armed Services Committee that the Soviet Union already had more Bisons than the United States had B-52s and that the So…

-Secret NOFORN- Chapter 3 100

-Secret NOFORN- Chapter 3 100 long-range area." 17 Fears of Soviet missile progress increased when Nikita Khrushchev stated on 23 April 1956, "I am quite sure that we shall have very soon a guided missile with a hydrogen-bomb warhead which could hit any point in the world." 18…

Following the success of this first mission, Bissell was eager to begin overflights of the Soviet Union. But even after the President granted his approval on 21 June, such missions could not yet take place for two reasons. First, President Eisenhower had agreed with a CIA and Sta…

First Overflights, 20 June - 5 July 1956 102 Norway OSLO Finland HELSINKI Mission 2003 20 June Mission 2009 2 July Mission 2010 2 July Sweden STOCKHOLM North Sea Denmark COPENHAGEN Baltic Sea AMSTERDAM Neth. BRUSSELS Bel. LUXEMBOURG France EAST WEST Berlin GERMANY BONN Wiesbad…

Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative. 103 Mission 2013 4 July Mission 2014 5 July Finland Sweden Norway OSLO HELSINKI STOCKHOLM Estonian S.S.R. Lake Ladoga Leningrad Lake Onega R. S. F. S. R. Khimki MOSCOW Ramenskoye North Sea Denmark COPENHAGEN Baltic Sea…

Secret NOFORN Chapter 3 104

Secret NOFORN Chapter 3 104 detachment had four aircraft working and could average up to two flights per day, Bissell told the President that the crews were "ready and eager to go in beyond the satellites" and overfly the center of the Soviet Union.23 Eisenhower replied that he…

the Soviet Union's submarine construction program. Mission 2013's route also overflew a number of major military airfields to make an inventory of the new Bison jet-engine heavy bomber.25 The second overflight, on the following day, continued the search for Bison bombers. Pilot…

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 3 106

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 3 106 Dulles that if we obtain any information or warning that any of the flights has been discovered or tracked, the operation should be sus- pended." Goodpaster called both Dulles and Bissell and was told that reports on tracking or attempted interceptio…

Additional Overflights, 9-10 July 1956 107 Finland Mission 2020 9 July 1956 Mission 2021 9 July 1956 Mission 2023 10 July 1956 Norway Sweden OSLO HELSINKI STOCKHOLM Estonian S.S.R. Latvian S.S.R. Lake Ladoga MOSCOW Volga North Sea Denmark COPENHAGEN Baltic Sea Lithuanian S.S.R…

Secret NOFORN Chapter 3 108

Secret NOFORN Chapter 3 108 shutter ruined much of the photography of one of the flights. The third mission (2023), on the following day, included the Crimean Peninsula.31 The film from the first overflight (4 July) was flown to the United States immediately after the U-2 lande…

Secret NOFORN Chapter 3 109

Secret NOFORN Chapter 3 109 SOVIET PROTEST NOTE The 4 and 5 July overflights brought a strong protest from the Soviet Union on 10 July in the form of a note handed to the US Embassy in Moscow. The note said that the overflights had been made by a "twin-engine medium bomber of t…

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 3 110

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 3 110 the United States delivered an oral protest concerning overflights of Poland on 20 June and 2 July. This was followed by a protest note from the Czechoslovak Government on 21 July. No formal reply was sent to the two Soviet satellite states.37 The d…

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 3 111

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 3 111 radar-absorbing materials and techniques proposed by Purcell. The effort, known as Project RAINBOW, got under way by the end of the year.39 THE END OF THE BOMBER GAP During the three-week period of 20 June to 10 July 1956, U-2s had made eight overf…

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 3 112

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 3 112 No one in the White House, the CIA, or the Air Force could reveal that U-2 photographs had actually provided the primary evidence for this change in the estimates.41 The need to keep the existence of the U-2 program secret caused problems even withi…

Secret NOFORN Chapter 3 113

Secret NOFORN Chapter 3 113 Bases for U-2 Operations in the Middle East, 1956 NORTH ATLANTIC OCEAN WEST Wiesbaden GERMANY Black Sea Turkey Adana Mediterranean Sea -Secret NOFORN- 724745 (B009152) 4-92 Suez takeover, however, the second contingent of U-2 aircraft and pilo…

Secret NOFORIN Chapter 3 114

Secret NOFORIN Chapter 3 114 military and foreign policy planners needed immediate information about developments in the eastern Mediterranean. Detachment A was, therefore, assigned the first Middle East overflights. On 29 August, U-2 missions 1104 and 1105 left Wiesbaden and ov…

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 3 115

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 3 115 The Suez Crisis was a major turning point in the use of the U-2 airplane. Before this crisis, the U-2 had been seen solely as a collector of strategic intelligence, with high-quality results considered more important than speed. U-2 film had, therefo…

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 3 116

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 3 116 October 1956. This unit's timely and accurate information enabled the PARAMOUNT Committee to predict the joint Israeli-British-French attack on Egypt three days before it took place. On 11 September, Detachment A pilot Jacob Kratt overflew the Frenc…

-Secret NOFORN Chapter 3 117

-Secret NOFORN Chapter 3 117 of British Canberra bombers at Akrotiri, Cyprus. The Anglo-French military buildup greatly irritated President Eisenhower, who considered these activities a violation of the 1950 Tripartite Declaration, in which the United States, the United Kingdom,…

Mission 1316, 1 November 1956 Turkey Adana Incirlik Airbase Euphrates Greece Rhodes NICOSIA Cyprus (U.K.) Akrotiri Syria Lebanon BEIRUT DAMASCUS Mediterranean Sea Israel Jerusalem AMMAN Alexandria Port Said GAZA STRIP Dead Sea Suez Canal Armistice Line Jordan CAIRO A…

-Secret NOFORN Chapter 3 119

-Secret NOFORN Chapter 3 119 at Almaza, where he filmed neatly arranged rows of Egyptian military aircraft. Continuing past Cairo to film another airfield, Hall turned southeast and then north to fly along the Nile, again crossing directly over Almaza. The photography from this…

-Secret NOFORN- Chapter 3 120

-Secret NOFORN- Chapter 3 120 angered by what it depicted: an Anglo-French attack on Egypt. He quickly called for a cease-fire and denied the United Kingdom any further U-2 photographs of the Middle East. The 1 November mission over Cyprus and Egypt also photographed Anglo-Fren…

Secret NOFORN Chapter 3 121

Secret NOFORN Chapter 3 121 facilities available, and the film had to be flown to Wiesbaden, adding a 10- to 15-hour delay. During the gradual buildup of the crisis, this delay had been tolerated, but, once actual hostilities broke out, US decisionmakers needed a more rapid resp…

Secret NOFORN Chapter 3 122

Secret NOFORN Chapter 3 122 RENEWED OVERFLIGHTS OF THE SOVIET UNION Throughout the fall of 1956, U-2s provided valuable coverage of the Middle East crisis, but they were not conducting their original mission of strategic reconnaissance of the Soviet Union. President Eisenhower…

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 3 123

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 3 123 Secretary of State Dulles said that, although he essentially agreed with the President's comments, he thought that "really important results" might be obtained by a seven to 10-day operation. He, nevertheless, questioned the long-term value of the re…

Secret NOFORN Chapter 3 124

Secret NOFORN Chapter 3 124 surgery), JCS Chairman Adm. Arthur Radford, DCI Allen Dulles, and Richard Bissell, Eisenhower explained why he refused to allow overflights of the Soviet Union: "Everyone in the world says that, in the last six weeks, the United States has gained a pl…

-Secret NOFORN- Chapter 3 125

-Secret NOFORN- Chapter 3 125 warnings to all pilots about the danger of opening the helmet faceplate at high altitudes, several pilots were known to do so. Some ate candy bars; Vito favored lemon drops. On the morning of 10 December, while Vito was undergoing prebreathing, the…

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 3 126

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 3 126 Although the U-2 overflights of Eastern Europe in late 1956 caused renewed Soviet protests, the sharpest protest came on 15 December 1956, after three specially modified USAF RB-57D bombers photographed the city of Vladivostok in a high-speed dash ov…

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 3 127

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 3 127 airspace because of compass error compounded by a slight error in the pilot's dead reckoning. Because of heavy cloud cover, the pilot, James W. Cherbonneaux, did not realize he was over the Soviet Union until he saw Soviet fighters attempting to inte…

-Secret NOFORN- Chapter 3 128

-Secret NOFORN- Chapter 3 128 remaining opposed to flights over most of the Soviet Union, Eisenhower finally agreed to permit some flights over peripheral areas such as Kamchatka Peninsula and Lake Baikal, as well as the Soviet Union's atomic testing area at Semipalatinsk. Such…

Secret NOFORN Chapter 3 129

Secret NOFORN Chapter 3 129 Chordwise wire Spanwise wire Ferrite beads Fiberglass member absorption devices for the U-2. Once these devices were installed on the operational U-2s, he explained, the "majority of incidents would be undetected." 73 "Trapeze" antiradar attachment…

Secret NOFORN Chapter 3 130

Secret NOFORN Chapter 3 130 the aircraft, was a small-gauge wire with precisely spaced ferrite beads. The wire and beads were supposed to capture incoming 70-MHz radar pulses and either trap them in the loop or weaken them so much that they would not register as a valid radar re…

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 3 131

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 3 131 engine of the U-2 known as article 341, causing it to overheat and flameout. Unable to restart the power plant, Lockheed test pilot Robert Sieker bailed out but was struck and killed in midair by the U-2's tailplane. The aircraft crashed in an area o…

Secret NOFORN Chapter 3 132

Secret NOFORN Chapter 3 132 Wreckage of Article 341, 2 April 1957 12 April 1957 article in the Chicago Daily Tribune was headlined, "Secrecy Veils High-Altitude Research Jet; Lockheed U-2 Called Super Snooper." 76 Because of its large wingspan, an out-of-control U-2 tended to…

-Secret NOFORN- Chapter 3 133

-Secret NOFORN- Chapter 3 133 boom, which could lift entire airframes 50 feet in the air, technicians could change the airframe's attitude and run radar tests almost continuously without having to fuel and fly the plane.78 By the summer of 1957, testing of the radar-deception s…

Secret NOFORN Chapter 3 134

Secret NOFORN Chapter 3 134 The search for a new home for Detachment C led the Agency to ask the Air Force in the autumn of 1956 for permission to locate the detachment at Yokota AFB, Japan. Because Yokota was already the base for one covert project (the very secret Air Force Pr…

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 3 135

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 3 135 DETACHMENT B FLIGHTS FROM PAKISTAN The most important series of overflights in the summer of 1957 were those that Detachment B staged to gather intelligence on the Soviet Union's guided missile and nuclear programs. President Eisenhower had approved…

Operation SOFT TOUCH Overflights, August 1957 Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative. Finland Mission 4035 5 August Mission 4036 8 August Mission 4039 12 August Mission 4045 21 August Mission 4048 21 August Mission 4049 22 August Mission 4050 22 August Missio…

Secret NOFORN Chapter 3 137

Secret NOFORN Chapter 3 137 U-2 photography of Tyuratam Missile Testing Range was the name Brugioni gave the missile base. Official Soviet releases concerning this base have always referred to it as Baykonur, but the community of Baykonyr is actually more than 200 miles north o…

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 3 138

part of the world." 84 The Soviet announcement made the intelligence community want even more information on Tyuratam, and a second U-2 piloted by Edwin K. Jones flew over the area on 28 August 1957, just one week after the Soviet ICBM launch. This mission obtained excellent vert…

Secret NOFORN Chapter 3 139

nuclear device. These photographs also revealed evidence of a recent, low-yield, above-ground nuclear test On its way to Semipalatinsk, the 21 August mission flew a search pattern over the western end of Lake Balkash looking for another Soviet missile-related installation and ma…

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 3 140

in the Far East were less risky than those conducted by Detachment A. Finally, the main target of U-2 photography after the bomber issue receded was Soviet missile and nuclear progress. The testing areas for these weapons were located in the vast open spaces of the south-central…

Final Overflight by Detachment A, 13 October 1957 0 100 200 Kilometers 0 100 200 Miles Barents Sea Norwegian Sea Troms Norway Narvik Murmansk Kola Peninsula Bodo Kandalaksha White Sea From Wiesbaden Sweden U. S. S. R. Finland Lake Onega Gulf of Bothnia Lake Ladoga HELSINKI Gulf o…

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 3 142

had flown a total of 23 missions: six over the Soviet Union, five over Eastern Europe, and most of the remaining 12 missions over the Mediterranean area.50 COOPERATION WITH NORWAY The final missions of Detachment A had one unforeseen result: the beginning of cooperation between…

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 3 143

DECLINING OVERFLIGHT ACTIVITY Operation SOFT TOUCH (4-27 August 1957) proved to be the high water mark of U-2 operations against the Soviet Union. Detachment B staged one more overflight on 10 September 1957, when a U-2 piloted by William Hall flew from Adana to photograph the K…

-Secret NOFORN- Chapter 3 144

U-2s flying well within international airspace above the Black Sea, as was the case on 27 October 1957, when electronic intelligence equipment on a U-2 flight over the Black Sea that never violated Soviet airspace revealed 12 attempts at interception by Soviet fighters.93 The so…

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 3 145

launched to take advantage of a newly discovered change in the west-to-east jet stream. Normally, this fast-moving air current stayed at an altitude of 55,000 feet, but, during June and July, it turned abruptly upward over the Bering Sea just west of Alaska, climbed to 110,000 fe…

Seeret NOFORN- Chapter 3 146

Goodpaster on 29 July 1958 to tell the Air Force that "the project is to be discontinued at once and every cent that has been made available as part of any project involving crossing the Iron Curtain is to be impounded and no further expenditures are to be made." 98 Two days lat…

-Secret NOFORN- Chapter 3 147

President Eisenhower was disturbed by the increased superpower tension that had resulted from violations of Soviet airspace by US balloons and aircraft because he still hoped to enter into arms limitation negotiations with the Soviets. On 8 September 1958, the United States sent…

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 3 148

shoot down a U-2. Before the program started, Richard Bissell had estimated that the U-2 would be able to fly over the Soviet Union with impunity for only about two years. This period was already over, and the Soviets were working frantically to devise a means to stop U-2 overfli…

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 3 149

speed, apply full throttle to the engine, then pull back on the stick and zoom as high as he could. In this manner the Soviet pilot hoped to come up directly beneath the U-2 so he could use his guns and missiles against the shiny U-2 etched in silver against the dark blue-black o…

Secret NOFORN-

Soviet MiG-21 interceptor (top), Soviet MiG-19 interceptor (middle), Soviet MiG-19 photographed by a U-2, 13 October 1957 (bottom)

Secret NOFORN

YAK-25RD Mandrake on display at the Gagarin Military Academy Museum (top and middle) U-2 in the new black paint scheme (left)

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 3 152

Force of 31—with the more powerful Pratt & Whitney J75-P13 jet engine. This new power plant generated 4,200 pounds more thrust while adding only 2,050 pounds more weight. With its greater power, the engine permitted the U-2 to reach operational altitude more quickly, thereby redu…

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 3 153

Abdel Nasser overthrew the Government of Iraq and assassinated the royal family. Long concerned by the growing influence of Nasser, who had close ties to the Soviet Union and now headed both Egypt and Syria in the new United Arab Republic, President Eisenhower decided that US int…

Seeret NOFORN- Chapter 3 154

become involved in the U-2 project in September 1956, when the United States supplied them with photography from U-2 missions. To handle U-2 material, the British created a new control system, which later merged with the US control system. By 1957 cooperation between the United K…

Secret NOFORN Chapter 3 155

select a group of pilots for the U-2 project. MacDonald agreed to Bissell's proposal and began recruiting RAF pilots to fly the U-2.110 In June 1958, representatives from the British Air Ministry came to project headquarters for an orientation and then sat down with CIA official…

Secret NOFORN Chapter 3 156

to working closely with the British from his wartime experience and believed that their involvement in the U-2 program was a natural aspect of their alliance with the United States.113 On the British side, participation in U-2 flights was a logical extension of the close coopera…

Secret NOFORN Chapter 3 157

May 1959, and used to fly weather missions on 7 and 8 May before returning to Adana. Two more weather-sampling flights took place over England on 5 and 6 October 1959. THE U-2 PROJECT AT THE BEGINNING OF 1959 Early 1959 saw Detachment B aircraft active primarily over Middle Eas…

-Secret NOFORIN Chapter 4 159

The Final Overflights of the Soviet Union, 1959-1960 THE U-2 AND THE "MISSILE-GAP" DEBATE Despite President Eisenhower's reluctance to send U-2s over the Soviet Bloc, he once again authorized overflights in the summer of 1959, after a pause of more than a year. The overriding f…

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 4 160

Premier Nikita Khrushchev asserted that the Soviet Union had an ICBM capable of carrying a 5-megaton nuclear warhead 8,000 miles. These statements seemed all the more ominous because, during this same month of December, the first attempt to launch the new US Titan ICBM failed. In…

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 4 161

As concern about Soviet missile progress increased, even the interruption in Soviet ICBM testing was seen as evidence of a Soviet advantage. Although the CIA correctly reasoned that the Soviets were experiencing difficulties in developing an operational ICBM, the Air Force assume…

-Secret NOFORN Chapter 4 162

availability of this new equipment." Quarles objected that the satellites would not be ready for up to two years, but the President replied that this did not matter because the Soviets would not be able to build a first-strike force of ICBMs in the near future. President Eisenhow…

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 4 163

to gather intelligence on the Soviet missile program. Discussions continued the following day with the addition of Secretary of State Herter, who stated in support of the CIA proposal that "the intelligence objective outweighs the danger of getting trapped." The strong backing of…

-Seeret NOFORN- Chapter 4 164

mention of overflights by the United States. After the trip was over, Khrushchev and other leading Soviet officials continued to make exaggerated claims about the extent of their missile force, adding to the confusion and concern within the US intelligence community. Thus in Nove…

Secret NOFORIN Chapter 4 165

Staff Nathan Twining each gave different figures for the number of deployed Soviet missiles. Although the CIA figures were based on evidence gained from overflights, Dulles could not reveal this fact to the Senate and, therefore, faced very sharp questioning.14 As a result of th…

First British Overflight, 6 December 1959 Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative. Baltic Sea Finland HELSINKI Lake Onega Lake Ladoga R. S. F. S. R. Irtysh Ob MOSCOW Volga Kama Kuybyshev U. S. S. R. Lake Balkhash Saratov Engels Airfield Kazakh S.S.R. Dnepr Don Ka…

Secret NOFORN Chapter 4 167

President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities. At a meeting of the board on 2 February 1960, Gen. James Doolittle urged President Eisenhower to use overflights of the Soviet Union to the maximum degree possible. The President's response, as summarized in Gen…

Secret NOFORN

Secret NOFORN Chapter 4 168 In authorizing another overflight of the Soviet Union, President Eisenhower directed that it be conducted before 30 March. Because of complications in getting permission from Pakistan to use the airfield at Peshawar, however, the mission could not be s…

Operation SQUARE DEAL, 9 April 1960 Kazakh S.S.R. Irtysh Dzhezkazgan Kyzylespe Saryshagan Lake Balkhash Tyuratam Aral Sea U. S. S. R. Amu Darya Turkmen S.S.R. Uzbek S.S.R. KABUL Afghanistan Iran Z Tadzhik S.S.R Peshawar RAWALPINDI Indus Pakistan Kirgiz S.S.R. 0 300 Kilometers 300…

Seeret NOFORN-

Seeret NOFORN- Chapter 4 170 One of the reasons why Operation SQUARE DEAL had been se- lected for the 9 April flight was that mission planners believed that penetration from the Pakistan/Afghanistan area offered the greatest chance of escaping detection by the Soviet air defense…

Secret NOFORIN

Secret NOFORIN Chapter 4 171 SA-2 surface-to-air missile strengthened when the Soviet Union did not protest the 9 April mis- sion. As Presidential science adviser George Kistiakowsky later re- marked about the lack of protest, "This was virtually inviting us to repeat the sortie.…

Seeret NOFORN

Seeret NOFORN Chapter 4 172 deployed SS-6 site because it could provide exemplars for photointerpreters to use in searching subsequent overhead photogra- phy for similar installations.²³ The two proposed overflights that would cover the northern rail- road lines received the str…

Operation GRAND SLAM, 1 May 1960 Norway Bodo Barents Sea Novaya Zemlya Sweden Murmansk Kandalaksha Finland HELSINKI Onupr Plesetsk Severodvinsk R. S. Lake Onega Lake Ladoga Kotlas MOSCOW Don Don Sea of Azov Black Sea Turkey Yur'ya. Kirov Mo ountains 173 Proposed mission route Act…

Secret NOΓΟΠΝ-

Secret NOΓΟΠΝ- Chapter 4 174 of Soviet ICBM sites. The other proposed overflight, Operation TIME STEP out of Greenland, was more likely to run into bad weather (which would affect both navigation and photography) because the flightpath would remain above 60° north latitude during…

Secret NOFORN-

hours on the ground. Originally scheduled for Thursday, 28 April, GRAND SLAM was canceled because of bad weather over the north- ern Soviet Union. This had been the case for the past several weeks. When this flight was canceled, the U-2 returned to Adana before sun- rise. That ev…

Secret NOFORN-

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 4 176 code letters JGOHB, JGOHB as they tuned from one prearranged fre- quency to the other. Then one of the Peshawar operators decided to tune in the guard frequency where the Morse transmission was stron- gest. He was able to discern a break in the letter…

Secret-NOFORN

area. The plane began spiraling down toward the ground and Powers looked for a way out. Unable to use the ejection seat because centrifu- gal force had thrown him against the canopy, he released the canopy and prepared to bail out, waiting to arm the destruction device at the las…

Secret NOFORN

Secret NOFORN Chapter 4 178 that the Soviets had discontinued radar tracking of the flight's pro- gress two hours earlier (0529Z), southwest of Sverdlovsk. Although there was no word from the Soviet Union concerning the missing U-2, key project personnel assembled in the Agency c…

-Seeret NOFORIN

This statement had been prepared for a "best case" scenario, that is to say, one in which neither the pilot nor the plane and film sur- vived. However, pilots had bailed out from extremely high altitudes and survived, and there was even evidence from previous U-2 crashes that muc…

Secret NOFORIN

Secret NOFORIN Chapter 4 180 J Khrushchev and the U-2 wreckage This revelation completely demolished the US cover story, and senior administration officials then debated what the appropriate course of action should be. Allen Dulles offered to take responsibility for the overfligh…

Secret NOFORN

Eisenhower stated that overflights had been suspended and would not be resumed, but he refused to make a formal apology. At that point the summit ended, as did all hopes for a visit to the Soviet Union by President Eisenhower. THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE OVERSEAS DETACHMENTS The loss…

Secret NOFORN-

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 4 182 Japanese Government, faced with growing anti-American sentiment and complaints in the press about the presence of "spyplanes" on Japanese territory, asked the United States to remove the U-2s. The very next day the CIA closed Detachment C; its U-2s we…

Secret NOFORN

THE FATE OF FRANCIS GARY POWERS Downed U-2 pilot Francis Gary Powers underwent extensive interro- gation at the hands of the Soviets. His instructions from the CIA on what to do in the event of capture were meager, and he had been told that he might as well tell the Soviets what…

Secret NOFORN-

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 4 184 Trial of Francis Gary Powers with Powers' behavior.⁴² After reading the debriefing reports, Allen Dulles expressed support of Powers' actions and told Powers, "We are proud of what you have done," but Dulles had already resigned as DCI in November 196…

-Secret NOFORN-

The Prettyman Board's finding was based on a large body of evi- dence indicating that Powers was telling the truth about the events of 1 May 1960: the testimony of the experts who had debriefed Powers after his return; a thorough investigation of Powers' background with testimony…

Secret NOFORN

Secret NOFORN Chapter 4 186 snubbed by President Kennedy, who one year earlier had warmly wel- comed two Air Force RB-47 fliers released by the Soviet Union. McCone remained hostile to Powers, and in April 1963 he awarded the Intelligence Star to all of the U-2 pilots except Powe…

-Seeret NOFORN

the U-2 project under the title Operation Overflight. Later he flew a light plane as a traffic reporter for a Los Angeles radio station and then a helicopter for a television station. On 1 August 1977, he and a cameraman from the station died when his helicopter crashed on the wa…

Secret NOFORN-

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 4 188 became more formal as the National Security Council became involved. Henceforth, proposed missions had to be submitted to the National Security Council (NSC) Special Group for approval. In the early 1960s, the Special Group consisted of the DCI, the D…

Secret NOFORN-

denied areas, whether by photographic, ELINT, COMINT, infrared, RADINT, or other means.⁵¹ The only exception to COMOR's area of responsibility was "reconnaissance and aerial surveillance in direct support of actively combatant forces." ⁵¹ By this time the Air Force had developed…

Secret NOFORN-

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 4 190 Most military reconnaissance missions were approved or disap- proved at the JCS level, but the most sensitive missions were submit- ted through the Secretary of Defense to the Special Group for approval. In addition to this Department of Defense appro…

-Secret NOFORIN

center that would bring together photointerpreters from the Agency and the military services. The report further recommended that the CIA be placed in charge of the new center. Ignoring Air Force claims that it should head such a center, President Eisenhower approved the report's…

Secret NOFORN-

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 4 192 months as the Deputy Director for Plans, Bissell found himself in- volved in a major struggle with Killian and Land, who were serving on President Kennedy's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (succes- sor to the Eisenhower administration's President'…

Secret NOFORN

Special Assistant for Liaison Office of Special Activities Assistant Director for Special Activities Deputy Assistant Director Executive Officer Security Staff Deputy for Technology Programs Staff Secret NOFORN Chapter 4 193 Deputy for Field Activities Advanced Projects Division…

Secret NOFORN-

U-2 Operations After May 1960 The loss of Francis Gary Powers' U-2 over the Soviet Union on 1 May 1960 marked the end of the aircraft's use over the Soviet Bloc. Soon after the May Day incident, President Eisenhower ordered an end to overflights. Similarly, his successor, John F…

Secret NOFORN

Secret NOFORN Chapter 5 196 overflights of the Soviet Union during the Berlin Crisis in the summer and fall of 1961. On 14 September 1961, Kelly Johnson noted in his project log: Have had request from Mr. Bissell to propose ways and means for increasing safety of the U-2 on prob…

Secret NOΓORN-

Nothing came of the proposal to resume overflights in the fall of 1961, as both the USIB and the Special Group came out against it, but, as long as U-2 photography remained clearly superior to satellite photography, the thought of obtaining U-2 coverage of the Soviet Union remain…

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 5 198 Special Group to approve U-2 overflights of Cuba. Known as Operation KICK OFF, these flights were designed to obtain intelligence on Cuban air and ground order of battle and to provide geographic data for choosing an invasion site. To allay fears tha…

Secret NΟFORN- Chapter 5 199 Aftermath of the Bay of Pigs invasion, 20 April 1961 Refueling a U-2 in flight was a very delicate task. When fully loaded with fuel, KC-135 tankers found it difficult to reduce airspeed to 200 knots, the safest speed for refueling a U-2. As for the…

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 5 200 In-flight refueling of a U-2 NIMBUS. Most of the flights were staged from Laughlin AFB, Texas, but three were flown from Edwards AFB, California, using in-flight refueling to extend the range of the aircraft. By the spring of 1962, having received r…

-Secret NOFORN Chapter 5 201 of the nature of the Soviet buildup in Cuba. Two days after the mission, the CIA reported in the President's Intelligence Checklist that there were at least eight surface-to-air missile (SA-2) sites in the western half of Cuba.⁸ (The map on page 202 s…

U-2 Overflights of Cuba, August - October 1962 Gulf of Mexico United States Mission 3086 5 August Mission 3088 29 August NORTH ATLANTIC OCEAN Bahamas (U.K.) Straits of Florida HAVANA San Cristobal Santa Clara Airfield Bay of Pigs Cuba Yucatan Channel Isle of Pines M…

203 Gulf of Mexico United States Mission 3098 5 October Mission 3100 7 October Mission 3101 14 October NORTH ATLANTIC OCEAN Bahamas (U.K.) Straits of Florida HAVANA San Cristobal Santa Clara Airfield Bay of Pigs Cuba Yucatan Channel Isle of Pines Mexico Caribbean S…

204 SAM Sites in Cuba, August 1962 Gulf of Mexico U.S. Straits of Florida Bahamas (U.K.) NORTH ATLANTIC OCEAN HAVANNA La Coloma San Julian Cuba Caribbean Sea U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay Cayman Islands (U.K.) Jamaica Haiti 0 100 Kilometers 0 100 Miles San Julia…

Secret NOFORN Chapter 5 205 overflights of Cuban territory. He argued that the loss of an aircraft on a mission that combined both types of flights would make it difficult for the United States to stand on its rights to fly over international waters. Bundy and Carter therefore ag…

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 5 206 that had been placed on U-2 overflights of Cuba, DCI McCone told the Special Group on 4 October 1962 that their policy of avoiding SAM sites had restricted the Agency to using the U-2 only in Cuba's southeastern quadrant. He questioned "whether this w…

-Secret NOFORIN Chapter 5 207 defenses of Cuba. If this overflight did not provoke an SA-2 reaction, the study recommended "maximum coverage of the western end of the island by multiple U-2s simultaneously."¹³ Because the danger posed by the SA-2 sites was one of the major topics…

Secret NOFORIN Chapter 5 208 DDCI Marshall S. Carter Washington for California and did not return until 14 October. Air Force control of the Cuban overflights became official on 12 October, when President Kennedy transferred "responsibility, to include command and control and o…

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 5 209 perceived as a jurisdictional dispute. Presidential Assistant for National Security Affairs McGeorge Bundy told DDCI Carter that "the whole thing looks to me like two quarreling children."¹⁹ Furthermore, no one wanted to speak out against a decision t…

Secret ΝΟΓΟΝ- Chapter 5 210 TENT AREA VEHICLES 7 MISSILE TRAILERS ERECTORS MISSILE TRAILER Soviet MRBM site in Cuba, 1 October 1962 thousands of feet of film returned by Air Force and Navy reconnaissance aircraft. President Kennedy used NPIC photographs to illustrate his a…

Secret NOFORIN Chapter 5 211 other means. Although by late 1962 photographic satellites had become an integral part of the overhead collection program, only U-2s could provide the highly detailed photography that photointerpreters needed to spot the early stages of work on missil…

Secret NOFORN Chapter 5 212 Long unhappy with President Achmed Sukarno's perceived sympathy to Communism and his institution of "guided democracy" in Indonesia, the CIA, after consultation with the State Department, began in early 1957 to supply financial assistance to a group of…

213 Detachment C and the Indonesian Revolt, 1958 TOKYO Japan Atsugi China East China Sea TAIPEI Okinawa India HANOI Macau VICTORIA (Port) Taiwan Hong Kong (U.K.) Burma Laos NORTH VIENTIANE VIETNAM Luzon South China Philippine Sea RANGOON Thailand Cubi Point Nava…

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 5 214 The first U-2 mission over Indonesia took place on 28 March 1958. By 12 June, when the operation was phased out, Detachment C U-2s had flown 30 missions over the major islands of Indonesia. Sanitized photos from these missions were used to brief membe…

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 5 215 wanted no more part of it. The US Government rapidly withdrew its support, and the remaining remnants of the rebellion collapsed. Four years later, the Indonesians freed Pope after Attorney General Robert Kennedy personally appealed to President Sukar…

-Secret NOFORN Chapter 5 216 While the Offshore Islands Crisis was still in progress, Detachment C began conducting flights in support of its weather reconnaissance cover story. On 14, 15, and 16 July 1958, U-2s flew high above Typhoon Winnie, which was causing great damage on Ta…

Secret NOFORN Chapter 5 217 in. The staging base in this case was Ta Khli, Thailand. These flights did not go unnoticed; on 13 September 1959, Hong Kong's China Post published a story headlined "U-2 of USAF Said Reconnoitering Red China at Unreachable Altitude." ²⁷ U-2Cs for Det…

Secret NOFORN Chapter 5 218 Lhasa, Tibet, November 1959 Although the plane was equipped with a camera, it carried no film and did not have a full load of fuel, which made it considerably lighter than an operational U-2C. As a result, the plane reached 76,400 feet—the highest al…

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 5 219 attention of Japanese reporters. One reporter even flew over the area in a helicopter, taking pictures of the U-2. These photographs appeared in many Japanese newspapers and magazines.²⁸ U-2 Crash in Thailand Flights by Detachment C U-2s over Tibet…

Secret NOFORIN Chapter 5 220 Recovery of Article 349, April 1960 The publicity generated by the U-2 incident stirred considerable controversy in Japan, and there were soon demonstrations against the continuing presence of U-2s in Japan. On 6 June 1960, project headquarters deci…

-Secret NOFORN Chapter 5 221 Detachment G Missions Over Laos and North Vietnam In the aftermath of the Powers loss, both of the overseas U-2 detachments returned to the United States and their aircraft and personnel were incorporated into Detachment G at Edwards Air Force Base i…

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 5 222 landing at the Scranton-Wilkes-Barre Airport, the pilot reported the incident to Headquarters. The Office of Security immediately contacted the Pennsylvania State Police, who sealed off the wooded area. Agency security officers soon arrived to search…

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 5 223 -SPOO Lockheed P-2V7 and P3A reconnaissance aircraft supplying the Nationalist Chinese Government with the most advanced reconnaissance aircraft available, the U-2. The CIA opposed a Nationalist Chinese U-2 program because such flights would destro…

Secret NOFORN Chapter 5 224 wanted the Nationalists to be allowed to begin operations, reluctantly agreed to wait until conditions were favorable.³⁴ The situation changed radically in May 1960 after the loss of Powers' U-2 destroyed the existing cover story for U-2 operations. No…

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 5 225 Detachment H U-2 at T'ao-yuan Airfield Taiwan on 14 December. Within the Agency the Nationalist pilots and aircraft were known as Detachment H, and they were based at the Nationalist Chinese Air Force Base at T'ao-yuan. One of the U-2s was painted w…

-Secret NOFORN Chapter 5 226 1961 PFIAB recommended the initiation of a limited number of U-2 photographic missions over the Chinese mainland. The President approved the board's recommendation. Because the US-Nationalist Chinese overflight program (Project TACKLE) was a joint ef…

227 Initial Overflights of China, January - March 1962 Mission GRC 100 13 January 1962 Mission GRC 102 23 February 1962 Mission GRC 104 13 March 1962 Mission GRC 106 26 March 1962 U. S. S. R. ULAN BATOR Mongolia Manchuria U. S. S. R. Shuangchengzi PEIPING (PEKING) NORTH…

Secret NOFORN-

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 5 228 Lan-chou, PRC, 23 February 1962 for air order of battle. In addition to the primary targets already de- scribed, the initial series of Project TACKLE missions obtained pho- tography of the submarine construction facilities at Shanghai and Wu-ch'ang, w…

Seeret NOFORN-

Seeret NOFORN- Chapter 5 229 Before the month was over, however, another confrontation be- tween Nationalist China and the PRC over the Formosa Strait erupted. The Nationalist Government reported a massive buildup of PRC troops and aircraft in Fukien Province opposite the Nationa…

Secret NOFORN-

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 5 230 Detachment H resumed overflights of mainland China in December 1962, but its missions now concentrated on the southern portion where there were fewer radars and SAM sites. During December 1962 and January 1963, the detachment conducted two successful…

Secret NOFORN-

within 30 miles of South Vietnam, all of Laos south of Paksane, and all of North Vietnam within 30 miles of South Vietnam or the coast. The remaining portions of Indochina remained the responsibility of the Agency's U-2s. Then in August 1964, following the Gulf of Tonkin Resoluti…

Secret NOFORN-

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 5 232 Detachment G U-2s made four more overflights of the Sino-Indian border areas in January 1963, which led to a PRC protest to India. Photography from these missions was used in January and again in March 1963 to brief Prime Minister Nehru, who then in-…

Secret NOFORAL

Charbatia was still not ready in early 1964, so on 31 March 1964 Detachment G staged another mission from Ta Khli. The first mission out of Charbatia did not take place until 24 May 1964. Three days later Prime Minister Nehru died, and further operations were post- poned. The pil…

Secret NOFORN

Secret NOFORN Chapter 5 234 The increased level of U-2 activity in the Far East during the spring of 1963 exposed a serious weakness in Projects IDEALIST and TACKLE, a shortage of aircraft. The Agency only had seven flyable U-2s when the TACKLE overflights of the PRC began in Jan…

Secret NOFORN

The danger posed by the growing number of SA-2 sites in the PRC was clearly demonstrated on 1 November 1963, when a second Project TACKLE U-2 was lost near the Kiangsi-Chekiang border on its way back from photographing the PRC's Shuangchengzi missile test range. As was the case a…

Seeret NOFORN

Seeret NOFORN Chapter 5 236 were normal when the pilot made this report. Project managers pre- sumed that the U-2 was downed by a direct hit or near miss by an SA-2 missile.55 President Johnson ordered a standdown of overflights of the PRC. This standdown was welcomed by the Nat…

-Secret NOFORN

Advanced ECM Equipment for Detachment H Demand for overhead photography of the PRC continued to grow, spurred in part by the results of earlier U-2 missions that revealed the presence of Soviet-made MiG-21s in the PRC. In addition, there were indications that Communist China migh…

Secret NOFORN

Secret NOFORN Chapter 5 238 ground force installations...would require about two man-years work, backed up by a larger expansion of photointerpretation ef- fort." 58 Use of Infrared Scanner Over PRC Nuclear Plants Photographic missions were not the only method used by the Agenc…

-Seeret NOFORN-

[REDACTED] The FFD-2 unit was installed in a U-2C [REDACTED] scanner [REDACTED] No more U-2 flights over China used the infrared The loss of yet another U-2 and its pilot made Nationalist Chinese officials reluctant to resume overflights of the mainland. They insisted that their…

Secret NOFORN

Secret NOFORN Chapter 5 240 With their demands met, Nationalist Chinese officials again con- sented to overflights by Detachment H, and operations resumed in February 1965 with three missions over the mainland. By this time US interest in the People's Republic of China was very h…

-Secret NOFORN

-Secret NOFORN

-Secret NOFORN Chapter 5 242 [REDACTED] The next mission mounted by Project TACKLE took place on 8 September 1967. The U-2C air- craft overflew central China and fell victim to a SAM in the vicinity of Shanghai; the fate of the pilot was unknown. This loss reduced the number of U…

Secret NOFORN

Secret NOFORN Chapter 5 243 week later the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese launched their Tet of- fensive in South Vietnam. The 303 Committee (the new name for the Special Group after 1964) decided on 1 February 1968 to suspend a group of overflights scheduled for February and cal…

Secret NOFORN-

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 5 244 Overflights by Project TACKLE Fiscal Year Overflights Total 104 1962 18 1963 17 1964 13 1965 30 1966 10 1967 14 1968 2 Peripheral Missions by Detachment H Detachment H did not cease its activities following the termination of overflights of…

Seeret NOFORN

Project TACKLE Peripheral Missions, 1969-1974 Fiscal Year Missions 1969 9 1970 14 1971 19 1972 23 1973 31 1974 17 Once the United States began seeking a rapprochement with the People's Republic of China, Detachment H U-2s came under more and more restrictions. Soon after…

Secret NOFORN-

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 5 246 Nationalist Chinese U-2R March 1972, when the President's visit took place, Detachment H ceased all operational missions.67 In March 1973, the TACKLE agreement with the Nationalist Chinese was renegotiated. Although no end date was set, the agree- me…

Seeret NOFORIN

Vietnam in January 1973, US military flights in the area were forbid- den. The Nixon administration, therefore, tasked the CIA with moni- toring North Vietnam's compliance with the cease-fire accords. The Agency dispatched several pilots to Taiwan under the cover of Lockheed emp…

Secret NΟΓΟΑΝ

Secret NΟΓΟΑΝ Chapter 5 248 U-2 on the USS Kitty Hawk, 5 August 1963 involved in seeking permission to base U-2s in other nations. Kelly Johnson began working on changes to the aircraft, and Office of Special Activities Deputy Director James A. Cunningham, Jr., a for- mer Marine…

Secret NOFORN-

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 5 249 O. N. R. N315X underwent these modifications, Detachment G pilots began undergo- ing training in landing on aircraft carriers. The first successful carrier landing took place on 2 March 1964.69 Use of Carrier-Based U-2 To Film a French Nuclear Test S…

Secret NOFORN

Secret NOFORN Chapter 5 250 December 1963, France had announced its intention to detonate a hy- drogen device over Mururoa Atoll in the Tuamotu Archipelago area of French Polynesia but had given no specific date for the event. The Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance had been fol…

Secret ΝΟΓΟΑΝ

There was never another Agency U-2 mission from an aircraft carrier. Although the idea of using a floating airbase to avoid political sensitivity proved feasible, the cost did not. Aircraft carriers are enor- mously expensive to operate and require an entire flotilla of vessels t…

Secret NOFORN-

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 5 252 U-2C and U-2R The U-2R used the upgraded Pratt & Whitney J75/P-13B engine and was able to fly higher-in excess of 74,000 feet and faster- Mach 0.72 (410 knots), which is 12 knots faster than the U-2C. When flying at the higher altitude, however, the U…

Seeret NOFORN

the scale of imagery needed to obtain the highly technical data de- sired by analysts. As a result, the Office of Special Activities asked the Hycon Manufacturing Company of Pasadena, California, to adapt its successful high-resolution 48-inch 9- by 9-inch format camera de- velop…

Seeret NOFORN

Seeret NOFORN Chapter 5 254 pilots were still flying missions targeted against the People's Republic of China, these missions did not overfly PRC territory. Increasingly, Agency U-2s flew missions that did not involve intelligence collec- tion requirements. Support to Other Agen…

Secret NOFORN-

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 5 255 Subsequent missions in support of Federal agencies included COMPASS TRIP in fiscal year 1973, when Agency U-2s photo- graphed poppy fields that had been planted by the Bureau of Narcotics in order to provide a standard for comparison with satellite im…

Secret NΟΓΟΠΝ-

Secret NΟΓΟΠΝ- Chapter 5 256 U-2 in flight to its destination. The C-141 carried support equipment to the [REDACTED] In October 1969, the third of these exercises took place at a different location. [REDACTED] No overseas deployment exercise was necessary in 1970, for ele- ments…

Secret NOFORN-

lead to the overseas deployment of Detachment G U-2s in 1974, when the CIA was tasked to monitor the Israeli-Egyptian and later the Israeli-Syrian disengagement areas. On 21 April 1974, a Detachment G U-2 with appropriate support elements arrived at Akrotiri, Cyprus, to conduct O…

258 - Blank -

Secret NOFORN Chapter 6 259

The U-2's Intended Successor: Project OXCART, 1956-1968 Before the U-2 became operational in June 1956, CIA project officials had estimated that its life expectancy for flying safely over the Soviet Union would be between 18 months and two years. After overflights began and the…

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 6 260

altitudes of 80,000 to 90,000 feet but only at subsonic speeds, just enough to keep it airborne.' The slow-flying Northrop design did not solve the problem of radar detection, and in 1957 the emphasis switched to supersonic designs. In August 1957, the Scientific Engineering Ins…

Secret NOFORN Chapter 6 261

A-1, 23 April 1958 variable position Hor. & vert. A-1, 26 June 1958 BACK 55 PMIILGE Johnson's first drawing of the "U-3" (A-1); revised version of the A-1

Secret NOFORN Chapter 6 262

The two most prominent firms involved in the search for a new aircraft were Lockheed, which had designed the successful U-2, and Convair, which was building the supersonic B-58 "Hustler" bomber for the Air Force and also working on an even faster model known as the B-58B "Super H…

-Secret NOFORN- Chapter 6 263

Lockheed design for a hydrogen-powered aircraft (the CL-400). The committee examined two other Kelly Johnson designs at this meeting-a tailless subsonic aircraft with a very-low-radar cross section (the G2A) and a new supersonic design (the A-2)--and did not accept either one, th…

Secret NOFORN Chapter 6 264

Convair FISH 444" (37') 67° 564" (47') Under a B-58B 10'1"

Secret NOFORN Chapter 6 265

Kelly Johnson's A-2 Design Prepared Sept 20, 58 Checked clj Approved LOCKHEED AIRCRAFT CORP. CALIFORNIA DIVISION TITLE Fay a Berane Job. Use 10,000# airplane at 135,000' - Try to eliminate fuselage except for cockpit & equip. bay L/D = 6.0 to 5.5 Wing @ t/c = 3% Tail (movab…

Secret NOFORN Chapter 6 266

Kelly Johnson's A-3 Design Sept 29 '58 CLJ Design of A-3. From previous work - a basic design of the following characteristics was derived (AAL trip - 3 page) Area - 500 ft² Gross wt. - 17,000 # Wt. at 100,000' - 13,200 2 - A.B. JT-12A 2 - 30" Ram jets. 300# payload. M=3.0 @…

Secret NOFORN Chapter 6 267

Although President Eisenhower supported the purchase of this type of aircraft, he questioned the plan to procure any before they had been tested. Promising that more thought would be given to the matter before such an order was placed, Secretary Quarles noted that CIA, the Defens…

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 6 268

Rodgers determined that a high-altitude object moving two to three times as fast as a normal aircraft would produce such a small blip with so little persistence that the radar operator would have great difficulty tracking it, if indeed he could even see it. Rodgers estimated that…

Secret NOFORN Chapter 6 269

Lockheed A-11 to be ignited. Since ramjet engines had only been tested in wind tunnels, there was no available data to prove that these engines would work in the application proposed by Convair. The second uncertain factor was the B-58B bomber that was supposed to achieve Mach 2…

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 6 270

designs and continued the competition. Lockheed continued to work on developing a design that would be less vulnerable to detection, and Convair received a new CIA contract to design an air-breathing twin-engine aircraft that would meet the general specifications being followed b…

Secret NOFORN Chapter 6 271

73'7" important design features that contributed to a small radar return were fiberglass engine inlets and wings whose leading edges were made of Pyroceram." Lockheed's new entry was much like its first, but with several modifications and a new designator, A-12. It, too, would…

Secret NOFORN Chapter 6 272

Wind tunnel test of A-12 model

Secret NOFORN Chapter 6 273

characteristics, although the Lockheed design's specifications were slightly better in each category. The Lockheed design was also preferable in terms of overall cost. In the vital area of vulnerability to radar detection, however, the Convair design was superior. Its smaller siz…

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 6 274

to proceed with antiradar studies, aerodynamic structural tests, and engineering designs. This research and all later work on the A-12 took place under a new codename, Project OXCART, established at the end of August 1959 to replace its more widely known predecessor, Project GUST…

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 6 275

Radar testing of A-12 mockup

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 6 276

Spike Antiradar features of the A-12 Outside duct Inside duct Chine Wing tooth Fin

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 6 277

eventually to the fuselage itself, creating what is known as a chine on each side. At first Johnson was concerned that these additions might impair the airworthiness of the plane, but wind tunnel testing determined that the chines actually imparted a useful aerodynamic lift to th…

Secret NOFORN Chapter 6 278

to achieve the desired target altitude of 91,000 feet. Afterward, he noted in the project log: "We have no performance margins left; so this project, instead of being 10 times as hard as anything we have done, is 12 times as hard. This matches the design number and is obviously r…

Secret NOFORN Chapter 6 279

invention of synthetic lubricants. Lockheed also had to search long and hard for a hydraulic fluid that would not vaporize at high speed but would still be usable at low altitudes. Finding a suitable hydraulic pump was just as difficult. Kelly Johnson finally modified a pump that…

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 6 280

OXCART pilot suit (B-120) characterized by great strength, relatively light weight, and good resistance to high temperatures, but high in cost. As strong as stainless steel, titanium weighed slightly more than half as much. Obtaining sufficient quantities of titanium of a qualit…

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 6 281

weight, Kelly Johnson did not attempt to insulate the interior of the aircraft. The pilot would therefore have to wear a type of space suit with its own cooling, pressure control, oxygen supply, and other necessities for survival. DESIGNING THE OXCART'S CAMERAS Providing camera…

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 6 282

The Hycon entry, designed by James Baker and known as the Type-IV camera, was a spotting camera with extremely-high-ground resolution. In fact, it was an advanced version of the highly reliable B camera developed for the original U-2 program. It used a 48-inch Baker-designed f/5.…

Secret NOFORN Chapter 6 283

CHOOSING PILOTS FOR OXCART Just as in the U-2 program, the Air Force provided considerable support to Project OXCART, including training, fuel storage, and weather service. One of the most important areas of support was the provision of pilots; all of the OXCART pilots came from…

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 6 284

storage capacity, and runway length were insufficient for the OXCART program, the site's remote location would greatly ease the task of maintaining the program's security, and a moderate construction program could provide adequate facilities. Construction began in September 1960;…

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 6 285

to reduce expenditures. After much refiguring, project officials decided to decrease the number of deliverable aircraft. Amendment No. 11 to the contract reduced from 12 to 10 the number of A-12s, for a total cost of $161.2 million.27 The cancellation of these two A-12s was offs…

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 6 286

DELIVERY OF THE FIRST OXCART The first A-12, known as article 121, was assembled and tested at Burbank during January and February 1962. Since it could not be flown to the Nevada site, the aircraft had to be partially disassembled and put on a specially designed trailer that cos…

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 6 287

Delivery of OXCART aircraft to Area 51 OXCART aircraft took to the air. He resigned from the Agency in February 1962, and his departure brought a major reorganization of the reconnaissance program. The Development Projects Division of the Directorate of Plans, with its two aircr…

Secret NOFORN Chapter 6 288

Secret NOFORN Chapter 6 288 In-flight refueling of the OXCART projects belonged to the Office of Special Activities, headed by Col. Jack C. Ledford, who now had the title of Assistant Director for Special Activities. These project management changes in the CIA had no immediate i…

Secret -NOFORN- Chapter 6 289

fillets, which had been secured to the airframe with epoxy resin, had to be recovered and reaffixed to the aircraft, a process that took the next four days. Once the fillets were in place, the OXCART's official first flight took place on 30 April 1962, witnessed by a number of A…

-Secret NOFORN- Chapter 6 290

-Secret NOFORN- Chapter 6 290 First flight of the A-12, 30 April 1962 Initial testing could not explore the A-12's maximum potential, since the J58 engine was still not ready. Developing this power plant to OXCART specifications was proving much more difficult than had been expe…

Secret NOFORN Chapter 6 291

that ultimately required a complete redesign of the air-inlet system that controlled the amount of air admitted to the engine. In the new, adjustable inlet the cone-shaped projection at the front-known as a spike-was designed to move in or out as much as three feet in order to ca…

-Secret NOFORN- Chapter 6 292

-Secret NOFORN- Chapter 6 292 The second new version of the OXCART was another reconnaissance aircraft. In December 1962 the Air Force ordered six "reconnaissance/strike" aircraft, which were designed to conduct high-speed, high-altitude reconnaissance of enemy territory after a…

-Secret NOFORN Chapter 6 293

-Secret NOFORN Chapter 6 293 OXCART. This technology would be invaluable for Air Force projects such as the B-70 bomber and for the civilian supersonic transport (SST) then being discussed in Congress. In the fall of 1963, several Presidential advisers expressed their concern to…

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 6 294

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 6 294 yet needed. Agreeing with McCone's position, President Johnson said the issue should be reviewed again in February.40 One additional argument in favor of surfacing the OXCART was the realization that the aircraft could not be used to fly undetected…

Secret NOFORN Chapter 6 295

these aircraft were hastily flown to Edwards Air Force Base. From this point on, the Air Force versions of the OXCART were based at Edwards and provided a diversion so that the faster and higher flying A-12s at the Nevada site could continue testing out of the public eye. The Pr…

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 6 296

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 6 296 Two more A-12s were lost in later testing. On 9 July 1964, article 133 crashed while landing when a pitch-control servo device froze, rolling the plane into a wing-down position. Ejecting from an altitude of 120 feet, the pilot was blown sideways out…

Secret NOFORN Chapter 6 297

decided to go to Nevada and take charge of the OXCART's development himself. His presence made a big difference, as can be seen in his notes in the project log: I uncovered many items of a managerial, materiel and design nature.... I had meetings with vendors to improve their op…

Secret NOFORN Chapter 6 298

Secret NOFORN Chapter 6 298 A-12s at Area 51 Defense McNamara told DCI McCone that he doubted that the OXCART would ever be used and suggested that improvements in satellite reconnaissance would very likely eliminate the need for the expensive OXCART program. Strongly disagreein…

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 6 299

Although overflights of the Soviet Union appeared to be out of the question, the OXCART's eventual employment elsewhere in the world remained a strong possibility, particularly after the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962 demonstrated the continuing need for manned strategic re…

-Secret NOFORN- Chapter 6 300

-Secret NOFORN- Chapter 6 300 demonstrated its ability to conduct overflights of Cuba by the 5 November deadline, which passed without any hostile action by the Soviets or Cubans. The detachment then worked to develop the capability for sustained operations with its five aircraf…

Secret NOFORN Chapter 6 301

growing hazards confronting aerial reconnaissance of the People's Republic of China. In three years the Agency had lost four U-2s over China, and the Air Force had lost numerous reconnaissance drones. The three men agreed to go ahead with all the preparatory steps needed for the…

Secret NOFORN Chapter 6 302

Secret NOFORN Chapter 6 302 sufficient support. The JCS and the PFIAB supported the CIA's advocacy of OXCART deployment. Top State and Defense Department officials, however, thought that the political risks of basing the aircraft in Okinawa-which would almost certainly disclose…

-Secret NOFORN Chapter 6 303

-Secret NOFORN Chapter 6 303 Soviet missile system. As early as 1962, the intelligence community began to be concerned about the actual purpose of new missile installations that first appeared near Tallinn, Estonia, and soon spread along the northwestern quadrant of the Soviet U…

Secret NOFORN Chapter 6 304

Secret NOFORN Chapter 6 304 hoped that the A-12's passage would provoke Soviet air defense personnel to activate the Tallinn system radars in order to track the swift OXCART aircraft. As the A-12 made its dash down the Baltic, its Type-I camera would be filming the entire south…

Secret NOFORN Chapter 6 305

raised the issue at President Johnson's "Tuesday lunch" on 16 May. Helms got the President's approval, and the CIA put the BLACK SHIELD plan to deploy the OXCART to the Far East into effect later that same day.60 The airlift of personnel and equipment to Kadena began on 17 May 1…

-Secret NOFORN Chapter 6 306

-Secret NOFORN Chapter 6 306 During the next six weeks, there were alerts for 15 BLACK SHIELD missions, seven of which were actually flown. Only four detected hostile radar signals. By mid-July 1967, the BLACK SHIELD missions had provided sufficient evidence for analysts to conc…

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 6 307

The only time the enemy came close to downing an OXCART was on 30 October 1967. During his first pass over North Vietnam, pilot Dennis Sullivan detected radar tracking. Two SAM sites prepared to launch missiles but neither did. During Sullivan's second pass the North Vietnamese f…

Secret NOFORN Chapter 6 308

Secret NOFORN Chapter 6 308 USS Pueblo in Wonsan Harbor USS PUEBLO MUNCHON NAVAL BASE advanced aircraft ever built was to be put out to pasture. The abandonment of the OXCART did not result from any shortcomings of the aircraft; the causes lay in fiscal pressures and competitio…

-Secret NOFORN- Chapter 6 309

models. The Secretary of Defense rejected this recommendation, presumably because the SR-71 would not be operational by September 1966.64 In July 1966, at the Bureau of the Budget's suggestion, a study group was established to look for ways to reduce the cost of the OXCART and S…

-Secret NOFORN Chapter 6 310

-Secret NOFORN Chapter 6 310 In spite of Helms's request and the strength of his arguments, the Bureau of the Budget memorandum was submitted to President Johnson. On 28 December 1966, the President approved the termination of the OXCART program by 1 January 1968. This decision…

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 6 311

3,300-foot film supply. On the other hand, the SR-71's infrared, side-looking aerial radar, and ELINT/COMINT equipment provided some unique intelligence not available from the A-12. Air Force planners admitted, however, that some of this equipment would have to be sacrificed in o…

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 6 312

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 6 312 Initial storage arrangements for A-12s at Palmdale POSSIBLE SUCCESSORS TO THE OXCART The OXCART was the last high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft produced for the CIA, although the Office of Special Activities did briefly consider several possible…

Secret NOFORN- Chapter 6 313

SUMMARY OF THE OXCART PROGRAM Intended to replace the U-2 as a collector of strategic intelligence, the OXCART was never used for this purpose. Its brief deployment was strictly for obtaining tactical intelligence and its photographic product contributed very little to the Agenc…

314

314 - Blank -

-Secret NOFORN Chapter 7 315

-Secret NOFORN Chapter 7 315 Conclusion U-2 OVERFLIGHTS OF THE SOVIET UNION Before the first U-2 overflights in the summer of 1956, project managers believed that their aircraft could fly virtually undetected over the Soviet Union. They did not expect this advantage to last ve…